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SHARING THE INCREASE IN VALUE OF SEPARATE PROPERTY
UNDER THE PROPERTY (RELATIONSHIPS) ACT 1976:
A CONCEPTUAL CONUNDRUM
MARGARET BRIGGS* AND NICOLA PEART**
In 2001 Parliament enacted some far-reaching amendments to the Property
(Relationships) Act aimed at bolstering the equal sharing regime and removing
obstacles to equality to secure an equitable outcome for spouses and partners.
However, the changes made to s 9A—the provision that enables Increases in value of
separate property to be converted to relationship property—fail in this regard. This
article will demonstrate that s 9A is now conceptually incoherent, internally
inconsistent and incompatible with the aims and principles of the Property
(Relationships) Act. Indeed, the amendments to s 9A are a retrograde step that have
undermined the coherent approach to the classification and division of increases in
value of separate property that the courts had already begun to develop prior to the
2001 amendments.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Property (Relationships) Act 1976 distinguishes between separate
property and relationship property. This distinction is one of the cornerstones
of the Act. Relationship property is shared, whereas separate property is not.'
Relationship property is exhaustively defined in ss 8 to 10 of the Act. In broad
terms, it comprises the family home and family chattels whenever and
however acquired, as well as any other property that the parties have acquired
through their joint efforts.
The underlying policy of the Act is that marriages, civil unions and de facto
relationships are seen as partnerships to which each partner is presumed to
contribute equally.^ Accordingly, they should share equally in the fruits of
their partnership.-* Separate property is not a product of the partnership and is
therefore retained by the owner. Any increase in the value of separate property
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Change" (2(X)8) 39 VUWLR 813.
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is also separate property,"* unless the increase in value is attributable to the
application of relationship property or the actions of the non-owning spouse or
partner.^ If the increase in value is attributable to either of these causes, the
increase in value is converted into relationship property and subject to division
between the parties to the relationship.
Under s 9(3) Matrimonial Property Act 1976 the increase in value was
divided according to the ordinary rules applicable to matrimonial property,
regardless of whether the increase was attributable to the application of
matrimonial property or the actions of the non-owning spouse. As the increase
in value normally related to non-domestic assets,* it was not equally shared if
one of the spouses had made clearly greater contributions to the marriage
partnership than the other spouse. In that case the increase in value was
divided in accordance with each spouse's contribution to the partnership.^ This
gave the Court discretion to award a greater share of the increase in value to
the owner, thereby giving effect to the concept of separate property as a key
element of the statutory regime.
Radical as the Matrimonial Property Act was at the time of its introduction,
it soon became apparent that the Act was failing to secure an equitable division
of the fruits of the marriage.^ To this end, the Act was substantially amended
in 2001 and renamed the Property (Relationships) Act 1976 to recognise the
inclusion of de facto partners. As part of the amendments, the rules pertaining
to the division of increases in value of separate property were also changed.
Section 9A makes two significant alterations to the old s 9(3). First, the
provision now expressly provides that both direct and indirect actions of the
non-owning spouse to the separate property of the other spouse or partner can
convert the increase in value into relationship property. Second, the division of
an increase in value distinguishes between the causes of the increase in value.
The ordinary rules of division apply to an increase in value attributable to the
application of relationship property, whereas an increase in value that is
attributable to the actions of the non-owning spouse or partner is divided
according to the contributions of each spouse to the increase in value.'
While the amendments in 2001 were aimed at bolstering the equal sharing
regime and removing obstacles to equality to secure an equitable outcome for
spouses and partners, the amendments in s 9A do not meet that aim. They will
not produce an equitable outcome because the provision is conceptually
incoherent, internally inconsistent and incompatible with the aims and
principles of the Act. Furthermore, by dividing the increase in value on the
basis of contributions to property. Parliament has taken us back to the days
before 1976. The facts of Rose v Rose, in which four courts and ten judges
4 Property (Relationships) Act 1976, s 9.
5 Property (Relationships) Act 1976, s 9A.
6 Domestic assets were equally shared under s 11, even if they were pre-marital assets, unless
the parties formally agreed otherwise under s 21 of the Act. See for example, de Malmanche v
de Matmanche [2002] 2 NZLR 838 (HC).
7 Matrimonial Property Act 1976, s 15.
8 Report of the Working Group on Matrimonial Property and Family Protection (1988) at 4.
9 Property (Relationships) Act 1976. s 9A(I).
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tried in vain to make sense of this provision, provide the perfect setting to
demonstrate the conceptual muddle that Parliament has created.'"
This paper commences with a brief overview of the law under s 9(3) of the
Matrimonial Property Act. That will show that when s 9A was enacted in
2001, the Courts were already developing a coherent approach to the
classification and division of increases in value of separate property that
reflected the aims and principles of the Act's equal sharing regime. That
development was arrested when s 9A was adopted, as will become evident
from an in-depth analysis of that provision in the latter part of the paper.
II. SECTION 9(3) OF THE MATRIMONIAL PROPERTY ACT 1976
Section 9(3) of the Matrimonial Property Act 1976 provided:
Subject to subsection (6) of this section, any increase in value of separate property,
and any income or gains derived from such property, shall be separate property
unless the increase in value or the income or gains (as the case may be) were
attributable wholly or in part—
(a) To actions of the other spouse; or
(b) To the application of matrimonial property,—
in either of which events the increase in value or the income or gains (as the case
may be) shall be matrimonial property.
This section merely classified the increase in value. It was silent on the
division. The ordinary rules of division therefore applied to any increase in
value tbat became matrimonial property. As the matrimonial home and family
chattels were always matrimonial property, unless the parties had formally
agreed otherwise, s 9(3) was normally concerned witb non-domestic assets. If
tbose assets were classified as matrimonial property, tben s 15 provided tbat
tbey would be sbared equally unless tbe owner's contribution to tbe marriage
partnersbip bad been clearly greater tban tbat of tbe otber spouse, in wbicb
case tbe property would be divided according to tbe respective contributions of
eacb spouse to tbe partnersbip.
A. The Early Years
In tbe years following the enactment of the Matrimonial Property Act 1976,
the High Court and, later, the Court of Appeal heard a number of cases on
various aspects of tbe interpretation and application of s 9(3). In tbe early Higb
Court decisions, it soon became apparent tbat tbe non-owner was expected to
meet a bigb standard of causation. Tbe majority of cases concerned assets of a
non-domestic nature, sucb as farms or businesses, and tbe reason relied upon
for tbe increase in value was generally tbe actions of tbe non-owner, ratber
tban tbe application of matrimonial property. ' ' In sucb cases, tbe Higb Court
10 KDR V JAR FC Blenheim FAM-2003-006-229, 6 July 2005; Rose v Rose HC Blenheim CIV-
2005-406-155, 14 October 2005. The Court of Appeal decision is reported at [20081 NZFLR
167 and the Supreme Court decision at [2009] 3 NZLR I, (2009) 27 FRNZ 656 [20091
NZFLR 814.
11 See Portar v Portar (1982) 5 MPC 120 (HC), for an example of a case involving the
application of matrimonial property rather than the actions of the non-owner. In that case, the
husband already owned what beeame the matrimonial home after the marriage. The couple
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adopted an inflexible interpretation of s 9(3), requiring proof of a direct link
between the non-owner's actions and the increase in value and its
consequences.'^ The Court disregarded indirect actions, such as the non-
owner's efforts on the domestic front that freed-up the owner to spend more
time developing his or her separate property. There was no appreciation then
of Lord Simon of Glaisdale's famous comment in 1964 that "[t]he cock bird
can feather his nest precisely because he is not required to spend most of his
time sitting in it".'''
Even if the non-owner could establish direct actions, the contribution had
to be reasonably substantial in order for the Court to recognise it as an
attributing factor in terms of s 9(3). Palmer v Palmer is a paradigm example of
the high threshold set by the High Court.''' There, the wife argued that her
efficient management of the household as well as her unpaid efforts in her
husband's business had contributed to the increase in value of shares in the
company. Hardie Boys J observed, however, that while household support and
the like "are cleariy contributions to the marriage partnership ... they are too
indirect to be regarded as causative of any increase in value of the shares."'^
Rather, "in view of the consequences that follow when a contribution to
increase in value is established ... the Court must look not only for a direct
contribution but also a reasonably clear and substantial contribution".'^ The
Court was clearly concerned to guard the concept of separate property against
the corrosive consequences of s 9(3).
In those cases where the Court was satisfied of a sufficient causal nexus
between the non-owner's actions and the increase in value, unequal division of
the increase was commonplace. Consistent with the policy and principles of
the Act, unequal division was based on contributions to the partnership, not the
property. Thus, in Bowen v Bowen, where the marriage had lasted for 17 years,
the increases in the value of a farm owned by the husband before the marriage
were held to be matrimonial property, but by applying s 15, the Court split the
increases 70:30 in favour of the husband.'^ In Thomson v Thomson the
marriage lasted for 31 years, but even then, the increase in value of the farm
lived at the property for 15 years before moving to another house, at which point the original
property reverted to being the husband's separate property. The wife's claim to a share in the
increase in value of the first home based on the application of matrimonial property was
successful. Holland J, at 121, found that there was "no dispute that the wife Lwas] entitled to
50 per cent of the figure to be assessed in accordance with s 9(3) of the Act".
12 See the discussion in Bill Atkin and Wendy Parker Relation.Mp Property in New Zealand
(2nd ed, txxisNexis, Wellington, 2009) at 69-70. Bill Atkin "Matrimonial Property; Time to
take stock" L1985JNZU 25.
13 Lord Simon of Glaisdale "With All My Worldly Goods" (lecture to the Holdsworth Club,
University of Birmingham, 20 March 1964) at 32.
14 Palmer v Palmer ( 1982) 5 MPC 116 (HC).
15 Ibid, at 117.
16 Ibid, at 118. Hardie Boys J held that her unpaid efforts in the business did not cause an
increase in value of sufficient substance for the Court to take cognizance of it. Nor did s 17
apply on the facts. Section 17 empowers the Court to compensate a non-owner for sustaining
the owner's separate property. See also n 43 in regard to the use of s 17.
17 ßoH-e« vßowen(1981)4MPC22(HC).
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that the husband had initially brought to the marriage was divided 60:40 in his
favour.'*
The Court of Appeal initially took a similarly rigorous approach to that
adopted by the High Court. In the first two Court of Appeal cases to consider
s 9(3), Walsh v Walsh (1984)'^ and Cross v Cross (1984),^° the non-owner
wives failed in their claims to get a share of the increase in value of their
husbands' separate property farms. Both women argued that their actions had
contributed to an increase in the value of the farms. In each case, however, the
Court found that the claimants had failed to demonstrate that their work had in
a "clear and appreciable manner" contributed not just to the earning of income
but also to the increase in value of the farms.^' The claims in respect of other
matrimonial property were not particularly successful either. Apart from the
homesteads—which had to be divided equally—shares in the remaining non-
domestic matrimonial property were split unequally in accordance with s 15.
In both cases, the Court awarded the wives 25 percent and the husbands 75 per
cent of the balance.
B. Subsequent Developments
By the mid-1980s concerns had also been raised in the lower courts as to
whether the total increases in value were matrimonial property under s 9(3), or
only that part of the increase directly produced by the application of
matrimonial property or the actions of the non-owning spouse.^^ In 1986 the
Court of Appeal in Hartley v Hartley^^ took the opportunity to resolve the
matter. Somers J found that "attributable" meant "owing to or produced by",
with the effect that only the increase in value or gains wholly or in part owing
to or produced by one of the factors in s 9(3) would become matrimonial
property. However, where the increase was due to a mix of factors such as
the actions of the non-owner as well as those of the owner and/or inflation, the
whole increase was matrimonial property.^'
18 Thomson v Thomson ( 1981 ) 5 MPC 158 (HC).
19 Walsh V Walsh (1984) 3 NZFLR 23 (CA).
20 Cross V Cross (1984) 2 NZFLR 433 (CA). See further, Caroline Bridge "The Division of
Farms Under the Matrimonial Property Act" [1983J NZU 20; Caroline Bridge "Division of
Farms Under the Matrimonial Property Act: a further review" [1985J NZLJ 292.
21 Note that Hardie Boys J, who had decided Palmer v Palmer (1982) 5 MPC 116 (HC)
(discussed above), was now a member of the Court of Appeal, and sat on the bench in both
Walsh and Cross. Shares in the matrimonial property were split unequally in terms of ss 15
and 18 in both cases, the wives receiving 25 per cent and the husbands 75 per cent of the
property.
22 See for example, the approach favoured by Prichard J in Mitchell v Mitchell (1983) 2 NZFLR
182 (HC). Compare Hollingshead v Hollingshead (1977) 1 MPC 108 (HC); Bowen v Bowen
(1981) 4 MPC 22 (HC); Oakley v Oakley HC Christchurch M155/78, 4 March 1981, as cited
in Hartley v Hartley [I986J 2 NZLR 64 at 75-76 per Somers J; Thomson v Thomson (1981) 5
MPC 158 (HC); Palmer v Palmer (1982) 5 MPC 116 (HC); Portar v Portar (1982) 5 MPC
120(HC).
23 Hartley v Hartley [ 1986J 2 NZLR 64 (CA).
24 Ibid, at 75 per Somers J.
25 Ibid, at 76 per Somers J. The Court of Appeal took the opportunity to make some observations
regarding the underlying policies and principles of the Matrimonial Property Act 1976.
Casey J, at 72, considered that s 9(3) concerned classification, not division, of matrimonial
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Two years later, in French v Frencfi'^ the Court of Appeal again rejected
the s 9(3) claim made by the non-owner wife, making it clear that if the non-
owner expected to share in the increase in value, he or she would have to do
more than merely work on the owner's separate property. In French, the
couple were married for less than four years, but during that time the
husband's separate property farm increased in value by $112,000. The wife
had taken part in the farming activities, doing much of the farm labour. The
Court of Appeal overturned the decision of the High Court, which awarded the
wife half of the increase in value. According to Cooke P, the wife's work was
"no more creative than that of a farm labourer"^'' and her efforts had not
"significantly enhanced the assets".^^ Instead, the Court exercised the
discretion in si 7 of the Act to compensate the wife for sustaining her
husband's separate property. Cooke P went so far as to observe that "a
reasonably liberal use of the power under s 17 to compensate for sustenance
should go far to exclude any injustice."^' The $56,000 awarded in the High
Court was reduced to $30,000 under si7.
It took another decade before there was any discernible shift in attitude to
s 9(3). In 1997 Hight v Highr'^ heralded the first signs of a more relaxed
approach to the non-owner's indirect contributions to their spouse's separate
property. The new judicial approach never had time to reach its full potential,
however, being overtaken by the introduction of the Property (Relationships)
Act in 2001.
The property at issue in Hight comprised a dairy farm in Taranaki and,
later, a property in Tauranga. A company owned the properties, and the
husband held shares in the company, which were his separate property. Mr and
Mrs Hight worked the Taranaki farm for several years, the wife playing a
significant part in the upkeep and day-to-day running of the farm. When the
couple moved to Tauranga, the wife took up paid employment, and her
earnings contributed significant cash flow for the family, which enabled the
husband to concentrate on the development of the Tauranga property and
kiwifruit orchard. The wife also put the proceeds of a life insurance policy
towards the cost of building the kitchen in the new home.
In the High Court, Elias J (as she then was) held that by her actions the
wife had made substantial and direct contributions to the assets held in the
company and that she was entitled to half the increase in the value of the
property and that the provisions of s 15 for departure from the norm of equal division on a
clearly greater disparity of contributions must be regarded as intended to deal with any real
injustice arising from the application of s 9(3).
26 French v French [1988] 1 NZLR 62 (CA).
27 Ibid, at 66.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 Hight V Hight [1997J 3 NZLR 396 (CA). For further discussion of s 9(3), s 9A and Hight, see
Mark Henaghan and Nicola Peart "Relationship Property Appeals in the New Zealand Court
of Appeal 1958-2(X)8: The Elusiveness of Equality" in Rick Bigwood (ed) The Permanent
New Zealand Court of Appeal: Essays on the First 50 Years (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2009)
99 at 118-123.
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. 31shares. Elias J thought that the type of conduct that may enhance separate
property should not be viewed narrowly. Provided there was a causal
connection which was more than "trivial",-'^ then s 9(3) should apply. Her
Honour was prepared to consider different forms of contributions such as those
of a domestic nature, reflecting a division of labour within the marriage. For
example, foregoing a higher standard of living or accepting more modest
family chattels or family home may be actions that could contribute to an
increase in value of separate property. In relation to the Tauranga property,
Elias J considered that "[t]o the extent that the wife's income precluded the
need to draw income from the company or realise assets, she contributed
directly to the value of the shares."''^
Professing to be "in general agreement with the approach adopted by
Elias J", '̂' the majority of the Court of Appeal (Richardson P, Gault, Keith and
Blanchard JJ) took a different approach, preferring to treat the increases in
value to the Taranaki and Tauranga properties as quite separate matters. In
regard to the Taranaki property, the majority followed the conservative
approach in French v French, ñnding that there was "nothing to show that any
of her efforts translated themselves into an increase in value".''' While the farm
had been competently maintained, the majority thought more than that was
needed, such as construction of new improvements or development work.̂ *
Yet again, causation was the stumbling block for the Court.
In regard to the Tauranga property, however, the majority concluded that
the wife's contributions, particularly her use of the proceeds of her life
insurance to help construct the kitchen, must surely have added more than
trivial value.^' Furthermore, from 1988 onwards, the wife's income was
signiflcant at a time when the company was under flnancial pressure. Her
income was used to avoid drawing from the company and was also used for
domestic expenditure and school fees. In that respect, the majority agreed with
Elias J that this constituted a signiflcant action to which the increase in value
in the 1990s was attributable: '*
[T]he fact that the contribution was also of a domestic nature does not disqualify it
from consideration under s 9(3).
We are satisfied that the wife's actions when the house was being built and in
becoming a breadwinner for the family and thereby enabling Mr Hight to devote his
energies to salvaging the finances of the company, are recognisable elements in the
cuaent value of the husband's bonus shares and that ... the increase in the value of
the bonus shares themselves, is matrimonial property.
31 Hight V Hight HC Tauranga M58/94, 9 October 1996. See Hight v Higltl [19971 3 NZLR 396
(CA) at 404 for a detailed discussion of Elias J's findings.
32 Hight V Hight HC Tauranga M58/94, 9 October 1996 at 29.
33 Ibid, at 33.
34 Hight V Hight [19971 3 NZLR 396 (CA) at 407.
35 Ibid, at 408.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid, at 408.
38 Ibid, at 408-409.
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Tbe fiftb member of tbe Court, Tbomas J, dissented on the basis tbat tbe
majority had placed an unnecessarily restrictive construction on s 9(3).^^
Tbomas J tbougbt tbat Elias J's approach was justified by s 9(3), wbich merely
requires an "increase in value". It was the approach of the majority that thus
created an anomaly. While accepting that the concept of separate property was
as much a policy of tbe legislation as the equal division of assets, Thomas J
expressed concern that the majority decision unduly favoured "the concept of
separate property at the expense of tbe fundamental objective and underlying
pbilosopby of tbe Act, namely, to recognise tbe equal contribution of busband
and wife to tbe marriage partnersbip and to provide for a just division of tbe
matrimonial property between the spouses when a marriage ends".'*"
Hight made several general propositions regarding the application of s 9(3).
It confirmed earlier case law that where any part of the increase is traceable to
tbe non-owner's actions or tbe application of matrimonial property, tben tbe
wbole of tbe increase occurring upon or after tbe first sucb action or
application becomes matrimonial property."" However, in otber respects, tbe
Court's views diverged from earlier cases. Tbe Court downplayed tbe degree
of input required from tbe non-owner spouse. Only actions or applications of a
trivial nature were to be disregarded because tbey would make no clearly
measurable difference to subsequent value and could not be said to be
causative of any increase."*^ Tbat may be compared witb Walsh and Cross
(above), wbere in 1984 tbe Court of Appeal required tbat tbe non-owner sbow
tbeir work bad clearly and appreciably contributed to tbe increase in value.
While Hight v Hight lacked a unified judicial stance, it nonetbeless isolated
some critical questions botb in relation to s 9(3) and, in a more general sense,
tested the traditional inviolability of separate property under tbe Matrimonial
Property Act 1976.''̂  Tbis cballenge to "separate property" was not confined to
tbe Matrimonial Property Act 1976. A parallel sbift was occurring at mucb tbe
same time in tbe treatment of widows' claims under tbe old Matrimonial
Property Act 1963 and in de facto property cases. Botb jurisdictions relied on
contributions to property by tbe non-owning spouse or partner and underwent a
similar development in relation to causation.'*'* Thus, in Re Mora (deceased)
tbe Court of Appeal beld tbat: '*'
39 Ibid, at 411.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid, at 406. The Court also noted that the onus of proof is on the non-owner spouse.
42 Ibid.
43 Note, however, that Hight rejected the suggestion made by Cooke P in French v French
[1988J 1 NZLR 62 (CA), that liberal use of s 17 could avoid injustice to the non-owner. In
Hight Blanchard J, at 409, thought that approach would effectively undermine the concept of
separate property basic to the Matrimonial Property Act. Nonetheless, under the Property
(Relationships) Act, s 17 has been used where the Increase in value was not caused by factors
covered by s 9A, but the non-owner has assisted directly or indirectly to sustain the property.
For example, O v O FC Hamilton FAM-2001-019-1355, 4 May 2006; V v V (Relationship
Property) [2007J NZFLR 350 (FC); B v Adams (2005) 25 FRNZ 778 (FC).
44 Matrimonial Property Act 1963, ss 5 and 6, which continued to apply to marriages ending on
death. Gillies v Keogh L1989J 2 NZLR 327 (CA) is the leading decision on property disputes
between former de facto partners.
45 Re Mora (Deceased) II988J 1 NZLR 214 (CA).
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[Mrs Mora's] prudent management and hard work in the home and on the farm
enabled substantial savings to be made, without which her husband might have
found it far more difficult or even impossible to make the purchase [of the farm]
from his parents.
Similarly, iti Lankow v Rose the Court of Appeal stated that domestic
cotitributions of a de facto partner could be indirectly linked to the acquisition
or retention of property by the owning partner.""^ Both of those jurisdictions
were discretionary in nature, leaving scope for the courts to develop the
jurisprudence in response to changing social values. The Matrimonial Property
Act 1976, on the other hand, was a code of rules with little flexibility. That
may explain the Court's reticence in widening the scope of s 9(3) too far.
Nonetheless, it seems that by then the seed sown by Lord Simon's appeal to
the cockbird feathering his nest was finally taking root.
The shifting judicial stance on s 9(3) towards the end of the Matrimonial
Property Act's life foreshadowed some of the changes made to s 9A in 2001.
Recognition that the actions of the non-owner may free up the owner to work
on their separate property is tantamount to the statutory recognition now
accorded to the "indirect" actions of the non-owner by s 9A(2) of the Property
(Relationships) Act. Other judicial developments were not disturbed by s 9A,
such as a more than trivial causation sufficing, instead of a clear and
substantial cause, and the conversion of separate property only from the first
causative application of matrimonial property or spousal action. Any injustice
that might result from dividing the increase in value was softened by the
availability of s 15. As the increase in value usually related to non-domestic
assets, the Court had considerable latitude to divide such property unequally
by treating the owner's introduction of separate property and efforts in relation
to that property as (usually) his contribution to the partnership. This enabled
the Court to achieve a just division of matrimonial property whilst at the same
time upholding the concept of separate property, thus striking a fine balance
between these two conflicting interests.
This approach to s 9(3) was validated by the first reform proposals
introduced by the National Government in 1998. There was no proposal to
amend s 9(3)."' The Government Administration Committee received
submissions to broaden the scope of the section, inter alia by including indirect
actions by the non-owning spouse, but it recommended by a majority that
s 9(3) remain unchanged to avoid inconsistency with the Act's separate
property concepts."*^ It was not until the newly elected Labour Government
introduced a Supplementary Order Paper in 2000 that s 9(3) was amended to
provide explicitly for an indirect causal connection between the actions of the
46 Lankow v Rose [1995] 1 NZLR 277 (CA).
47 The Matrimonial Property Amendment Bill 1998 as originally introduced, did not include any
amendments to s 9(3), even though the amendments were largely drawn from the
recommendations of the Report of the Working Group on Matrimonial Property and Family
Protection (1988); see Matrimonial Property Amendment Bill 1998 (109-1) (explanatory
note) at i.
48 Matrimonial Property Amendment Bill (109-2) (commentary from the Government
Administration Committee) at ix.
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non-owning spouse or partner and the increase in value of the owner's separate
49
property.
in. SECTION 9A PROPERTY (RELATIONSHIPS) ACT 1976, AS AMENDED IN 2001
In 2001 Parliament radically changed the entitlement of a non-owner to share
in the increase in value of separate property of his or her spoiise or partner.
Section 9A replaces s 9(3) and provides:
9A When separate property becomes relationship property
(1) If any increase in the value of separate property, or any income or gains
derived from separate property, were attributable (wholly or in part) to the
application of relationship property, then the increase in value or (as the case
requires) the income or gains are relationship property.
(2) If any increase in the value of separate property, or any income or gains
derived from separate property, were attributable (wholly or in part, and
whether directly or indirectly) to actions of the other spouse or partner,
then—
(a) the increase in value or (as the case requires) the income or gains are
relationship property; but
(b) the share of each spouse or partner in that relationship property is to be
determined in accordance with the contribution of each spouse or
partner to the increase in value or (as the case requires) the income or
gains.
(3) Any separate property, or any proceeds of the disposition of any separate
property, or any increase in the value of, or any income or gains derived from,
separate property, is relationship property if that separate property or (as the
case requires) those proceeds or the increase in value or the income or gains
are used—
(a) with the express or implied consent of the spouse or partner that owns,
receives, or is entitled to them; and
(b) for the acquisition or improvement of, or to increase the value of, or the
amount of any interest of either spouse or de facto partner in, any
property referred to in section 8(1).
(4) Subsection (3) is subject to section 10.
As under s 9(3), there are two avenues through which the increase in value
in separate property can become relationship property: first, by the application
of relationship property and, second, by actions of the non-owning spouse or
partner. As before, if either of these two causes exists the increase in value is
classified as relationship property. But unlike s 9(3), s 9A treats increases in
value resulting from the application of relationship property differently from
increases attributable to actions of the non-owning spouse or partner.
Parliament also repealed s 15, thereby removing the liberal exception to equal
49 Section 9A was first inserted by clause 10 Supplementary Order Paper 2000 (25), which was
introduced on 16 May 2000. That proposal was endorsed by the select committee's Report of
Justice and Electoral Committee on the Matrimonial Property Amendment Bill and
Supplementary Order Paper No 25 (109-3) at 15.
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division of non-domestic property that the Coun had relied on frequently in
conjunction with s 9(3). The consequences of these changes were considered
in Rose v Rose, a farming case, which went all the way to the Supreme Coun.
A. Rose V Rose
1. Facts
Mr and Mrs Rose married in 1979 and separated in 2003. At the time of the
marriage, Mr Rose already owned a farm known as Cloverlea, which he
farmed in partnership with his father and brother. They also farmed two further
properties together: Poplars, owned by his father, and Brentwood, which his
brother owned. The pannership farmed, but did not own the propenies. At
various times from the late 1980s onwards, the brothers sold substantial pans
of their respective farms to reduce debt levels. Recognising the potential of the
remaining land for grape growing, they later developed vineyards on their
propenies. When their father died in 1995, the two brothers inherited Poplars
as tenants-in-common. From 2000, grapevine planting was also commenced on
pan of Poplars.
When Mr and Mrs Rose separated in 2003, Mrs Rose made claims in
respect of both Poplars and Cloverlea. She claimed a share of the increase in
the value of Poplars from the date of the vineyard development, arguing under
s9A(l) that the increase in value was at least in pan attributable to the
application of relationship propeny, namely, the pannership funds used to
develop the vineyard.
Mrs Rose's claim in respect of Cloverlea was under s 9A(2). She argued
that the increase in the value of Cloverlea was at least partly attributable to her
indirect actions. She had never worked on the farm, but she claimed that her
work in the home, raising the family, and her income from outside
employment were contributions to the marriage partnership which freed up her
husband to work for the benefit of his separate property. She further argued
that she had prevented the farm debt from reaching an unsustainable level with
the end result that the farm could be retained.
2. Family Court
The Family Coun dealt briefly with s 9A and did not specifically distinguish
between subsections (1) and (2).'° Judge Grace found that the increases in
value had in part occurred due to the application of partnership funds, of which
the husband's share was relationship propeny. Mrs Rose had also contributed
both directly and indirectly to the increases. Mrs Rose's share in both farms
was fixed at half of the identified increases.^' Mr Rose appealed.
3. High Court
On appeal. Wild J distinguished between the two limbs of s 9A. His Honour
concluded that no relationship property had been applied to either Poplars or
Cloverlea and that the Family Coun had been wrong to find that Mrs Rose had
50 KDR V JAR FC Blenheim FAM-2003-006-229, 6 July 2005.
51 In respect of Poplars, Mrs Rose's share was 25 per cent of the total increase in value because
her husband owned 50 per cent of the farm.
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a claim under s 9A(1).'^ His Honour held that neither the gross income of the
partnership nor its borrowings from the bank were relationship property. They
belonged to the partnership, not to either party.
Wild J found that Cloverlea would have been in "jeopardy" but for Mrs
Rose's contributions, but nonetheless rejected the claim under s 9A(2) because
he was unable to conclude that her actions had contributed to the increase in
the value. Rather, it was attributable to inflation and the demand for land for
viticulture. Wild J determined that Mrs Rose's financial contribution was more
than "merely rendering assistance" and her actions sustained the property in
part in terms of s 17. She was awarded $75,000 for sustenance of her
husband's separate property. As a result of the High Court decision, she
received about $238,000, while the husband received about $2.16m.
4. Court of Appeal
The Court of Appeal set aside the order made by the High Court, and instead
made orders in favour of Mrs Rose under both ss 9A(1) and (2).'-' In terms of
s 9A(1), the Court considered that there had been an application of relationship
property. Mr Rose's interest in the assets of the partnership acquired after the
date of the marriage was relationship property. The application of the
partnership funds to Poplars attributed at least in part to the increase in value.
Mrs Rose was awarded $283,000 under s9A(l), being one half of her
husband's share in Poplars.
The Court also allowed the appeal under s 9A(2) in respect of Cloverlea.
Valuations showed that the land had increased from an estimated $300,000 in
1979 when Mr and Mrs Rose married, to $1.5m in 2005 at the hearing date. In
response to Mr Rose's argument that any increase in value was the result of
inflation, the Court noted that the matter had to be considered in the round in
the context of a marriage of over 20 years duration in which both parties had
put their efforts into maintaining the household. Those circumstances did not
mean, however, that a claim under s 9A(2) could succeed where there was no
increase in value, nor where the increase was not attributable in some way
(directly or indirectly) to the actions of the non-owning spouse. If all of the
increase was clearly related to inflationary matters there could be no link as
required by s 9A. However, the Court though that it was open to it "to infer
that at least some of the increase must relate to the development of the land.
We do not see s 9A in the present circumstances as requiring evidence as to
how much of that increase relates to inflation and how much to other
matters."'"* In the Court's opinion, Mr Rose's contributions to the increase in
value were greater than his wife's because he had brought the house and the
farmland to the marriage. The Court made an assessment that Mrs Rose's share
based on her contributions to the increase in value should be put at
40 per cent.''
52 Rose V Rose (No 2) HC Blenheim CIV-2005-406-155. 22 December 2005.
53 Ro.ie V Rose [2008] NZFLR 167 (CA).
54 Ibid. atl80J.
55 Ibid, at [81 J. See also the obiter comments on s 17 at l83J-[85].
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5. Supreme Court
Tbe Supreme Court upbeld tbe finding of tbe Court of Appeal tbat tbe
busband's interest in tbe partnersbip was relationsbip property and tbat it bad
been used to increase tbe value of Poplars.'^ Mrs Rose was tbus entitled to a
balf sbare of tbe increase in value of Poplars since 2000. Tbe Court noted tbat
wbile some of tbe increase in tbe value of Poplars "may well bave been tbe
product of inflation or a general rise in tbe value of land in Marlborougb
suitable for viticulture ... tbat does not defeat a claim under [s 9A(1)] if some
part of tbe increase (excluding anytbing wbicb is merely trivial or minimal) is
attributable to tbe application of relationsbip property."^' Tbe Court tbus
affirmed tbe Court of Appeal's dictum in Hight v Hight tbat tbe connection
need not be substantial. Tbe Court furtber observed tbat "[o]nce a causative
link is establisbed between tbe application of relationsbip property and some
sucb increase in value, tbe wbole of tbe increase, bowsoever tbe balance of tbe
increase arose, is required by subs (1) to be treated as relationsbip property."
(footnote omitted)'**
Tbe Court also rejected Mr Rose's claim tbat bis wife's actions did not
translate into an increase in value of Cloverlea. Tbe new subsection 9A(2) was
intended to overcome tbe problem tbat tbe actions of tbe non-owner spouse
could be considered too remote from any increase in value of separate property
wbere tbere was no direct pbysical connection between tbe spouse's activity
and tbe increase in value:''
It follows that an increase in value is divisible between the parties unless it can truly
be said that it has not derived from the conduct of the non-owning spouse in any
material way. That may be the situation in the case of a purely passive investment
but, with an asset like a farm or other business in which the owning spouse works,
it will often be likely that some conduct of the non-owning spouse will have had
some direct or indirect influence on any increase in value.
Mrs Rose's efforts in tbe bome and witb tbe cbildren, togetber witb ber
meeting a significant proportion of tbe family's domestic expenses tbrougb ber
earnings, enabled ber busband to dedicate bimself to tbe business partnersbip
and allowed bim to moderate bis drawings so tbat more labour and more
money (or in reality more borrowing capacity) was available to tbe partners for
tbe development of tbe vineyards, including tbe vineyard on Cloverlea. Had it
not been for Mrs Rose's financial contribution produced by working off tbe
farm, tbe Court concluded tbat it would bave been likely tbat all of Cloverlea
would bave been sold and tbe opportunity of later development of tbe vineyard
would not bave existed.*" Tbese findings ecbo tbe comments made by tbe
Court of Appeal in Hight v Hight in relation to Mrs Higbt's contributions to
tbe Tauranga property.
Tbe Supreme Court agreed witb tbe Court of Appeal's unequal division of
tbe increase in value in favour of Mr Rose. Tbat was justified because on all
56 Rose V Rose [20091 NZSC 46, [20091 3 NZLR I.
57 Ibid, at [301.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid, at [441.
60 Ibid.
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the evidence his contributions to the increase in value, with credit for the
inflation and the general increase in the value of viticultural land, were greater
than those of the wife.*' However, the Court was critical of s *̂
Section 9A(2) gives no guidance about how this task [of evaluating contributions to
the increase in value] is to be performed but a significantly different approach from
that under subs (1) is plainly required. The principles found in s IN ... have little or
no application under s9A(2)(b). Nor does s 18 which deals with contributions to
the marriage, rather than contributions to an increase in value of a particular piece
of separate property. The circumstances in which that increase occurred require
careful assessment but arithmetical exactitude cannot be achieved and in the end the
evaluation of the relative contributions is likely to be a matter of general
impression.
The Court was concerned that in cases where a major portion of the increase in
value is due to inflation or a general rise in value of a certain type of property
(as in the case of land suitable for viticulture), there is an issue as to how such
increases should be treated. The difficulty is that inflationary increases and the
like have not resulted from the actions of either party. Yet s 9A(2) requires
them to be weighed as contributions. The Court concluded that the best
approach is that the ownership of the separate property from which the
increase has arisen be treated under s 9A(2)(b) as a contribution made by the
owner spouse. The Court would evaluate that contribution together with other
contributions to the increase in value made by the owner spouse. The Court
should then weight the aggregate of those contributions against the identified
contributions of the non-owner to that increase.*^
B. Analysis of Section 9A
The Supreme Court decision raises several issues in relation to both s9A(l)
and s 9A(2). In view of the significant differences between the two limbs, they
will be analysed separately, beginning with s 9A(1).
1. Section 9Ail)
The wording of s9A(l) is substantively identical to s 9(3). As before, if the
increase in value of separate property is attributable to the application of
relationship property, then the increase in value becomes relationship
property." So, provided there is more than a trivial or minimal causal
connection, all of the increase in value from the first causative contribution is
converted into relationship property even if the balance of the increase arises
from inflation or some other factor external to the parties. This provision is
problematic in regard to both classification and division.
(a) Classification
There is now a curious distinction between the two limbs of s 9A. Whereas
s 9A(2) was amended to include indirect actions by the non-owning spouse or
partner, no such change was made to s9A(l). A contextual interpretative
61 Ibid, at [51 J.
62 Ibid,atl46J.
63 lbid,at[47J.
64 See Blanchard J's comments in Rose v Rose: ibid, at [30J.
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approach suggests that the application of relationship property must therefore
be directly linked to the increase in value. If Mrs Rose had contributed her
income to reducing debt of the farming partnership rather than covering
expenses of the household, Cloverlea's increase in value would have come
under s 9A(1), rather than 9A(2). That is, Cloverlea's increase in value would
have resulted from an application of relationship property and would have
entitled Mrs Rose to an equal share of the increase. By separating s 9A into
two limbs and providing for an indirect causal link only in the second limb.
Parliament has created a dichotomy that is inexplicable. The income Mrs Rose
used to support the household was relationship property and indirectly
attributed to the farm's increase in value by allowing Mr Rose to moderate his
drawings from the partnership to support his family and retain the farm.
Without Mrs Rose's financial contribution, it was very likely that Cloverlea
would have been sold and the opportunity of later developing the vineyard
would not have existed.*' In spite of that close connection and the nature of
Mrs Rose's contribution, it was too remote for purposes of s 9A(1) and the use
of Mrs Rose's income was instead classified as an indirect action.
Whether the increase in value arose from the application of relationship
property or the non-owner's actions would not have mattered on the Hight v
Hight analysis, because the consequence of classifying the increase as
matrimonial property would have been the same whichever of the two causes
was applicable or if there was a combination of causations. But under s 9A, the
distinction is crucial to the division of the increase in value.
(b) Division
As in s 9(3), s9A(l) does not stipulate how the increase in value is to be
divided between the parties. The normal equal sharing rules therefore apply.
This introduces a further dichotomy between the two limbs of s 9A. Because
s 15 of the Matrimonial Property Act has been repealed, any increase in value
attributable to the application of relationship property is now divided equally
between the parties unless the parties' relationship was of short duration or
there are extraordinary circumstances which make equal sharing repugnant to
justice.^* The latter exception sets a very high threshold. Equal sharing is
therefore the norm in relationships of three or more years' duration. This
means that the non-owner will not only share equally in the increase in value
caused by the application of relationship property, but also in the increase
generated by inflation and the owner's own actions. Section 9A(I) thus
represents a substantial inroad into the separate property concept.
The repeal of s 15 was a significant change. But the effect of this change on
s 9A(I) received no attention during the legislative process. Applications under
s 9(3) were principally concerned with domestic actions of wives in relation to
increases in value of their husband's farm or business. There were very few
cases in which the application of relationship property was the cause of the
increase in value. That may explain Parliament's focus on spousal actions and
the consequences that should flow from them. The lack of comment on s 9A(1)
65 Ibid, atl44J.
66 Property (Relationships) Act 1976, s s l l , 13-14AA. The abolition of the distinction between
domestic and no-domestic assets implements the recommendation of the Report of the
Working Group on Matrimonial Property and Family Protection (1988) at 13.
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suggests that Parliament may have overlooked the effect of repealing s 15 on
s9A(l). The concern to protect the separate property concept where the
increase in value results from actions was not replicated in s 9A(1).
2. Section 9A(2)
The second limb of s 9A changes both the classification requirements and the
consequences, but in opposing directions. While the classification
requirements have been liberalised to include indirect actions, the division of
any consequential increase in value is based on contributions to the property.
In contrast to s9A(l), there is no presumption of equal sharing. Nor do
contributions to the pannership determine division.
(a) Classification
By expressly including indirect actions of the non-owning spouse or panner as
a causative element, s 9A(2) implements a recommendation of the 1988
Working Group on Matrimonial Propeny and Family Protection. It found that
a direct link excluded imponant assets from the matrimonial propeny pool and
recommended that actions amounting to a contribution to the marriage
pannership, rather than to the propeny itself, should be relevant in establishing
the causal link. *' That is now the case. All the contributions listed in s 18 are
relevant.
However, in Rose v Rose the Supreme Coun goes a step funher. It
presumes that an increase in value is relationship propeny "unless it can truly
be said that it has not derived from the conduct of the non-owning spouse in
any material way", as in the case of a purely passive investment.*^ This
appears to remove the onus on the non-owner to prove actions and their direct
or indirect causal connection to the increase in value. If so, the boot is now on
the other foot. It will be up to the owner to provide evidence that the increase
in value is unrelated to the non-owner's actions, for example by showing that
the increase is solely or almost entirely due to inflation or market forces.
As before, only the increase in value from the time of the non-owner's
relevant actions will be convened into relationship propeny, even if the
balance of the increase is substantial and attributable to the actions of the
owner or simply the result of inflation or a general increase in the value of the
propeny in question. This rule goes back to the Coun of Appeal's decision in
Hartley v Hartley. While this rule may be workable in relation to direct
actions, the presumption referred to above may make it difficult to disprove the
causal link in relation to indirect actions, panicularly in long relationships.
(b) Division
If the increase in value is attributable to the actions of the non-owning spouse
or panner, then s 9A(2) provides that the increase in value is divided according
to each pany's contribution to the increase in value. This change addresses the
concern that division under s 9(3) undermined the concept of separate
property. The aim of s 9A(2) is to preserve that concept by restricting the non-
owner's share to the increase resulting from his or her actions only. It is in
sharp contrast to the division under s9A(l), where the presumption of equal
67 Report of the Working Group on Matrimonial Property and Family Protection (1988) at 21.
68 Rose V Rose 12009J NZSC 46, [20091 3 NZLR 1 at [441 per Blanchard J.
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sharing applies to all of the increase in value. This is a further example of
s 9A's internal inconsistency in relation to what should be shared and what
should remain separate property.
Furthermore, s 9A(2) is the only provision in the Act where division is
based on contributions to property rather than the partnership. This is not in
keeping with the Act's purpose and principles of dividing property on the basis
of contributions to the partnership.® It harks back to the Matrimonial Property
Act 1963™ and the constructive trust jurisdiction employed to resolve property
disputes between de facto partners prior to their inclusion in the Property
(Relationships) Act. As both of these jurisdictions were thought to produce
unjust and unpredictable results, it is surprising that Parliament chose to use
property contributions as the basis for dividing increases in value of separate
property. Section 9A(2) is also internally inconsistent, because jurisdiction is
determined by contributions to the relationship whereas division is based on
contributions to the property.
(c) Actions of the owning spouse or partner
When the changes to what is now s 9A were being debated, the Law Society
suggested that actions of the owning spouse or partner during the relationship
should also convert the increase in value into relationship property. It argued
that an owner could devote all his or her time and effort during the relationship
to a separate property business and retain the profits as separate property.^' If
the profits were received as salary or wages, they would be relationship
property. That suggestion was rejected on grounds of inconsistency with the
separate property concepts in the Act. However, s 15A goes some way to
addressing the problem identified by the Law Society, as part of the economic
disparity remedies. It empowers the Court to compensate the non-owning
spouse or partner if the increase in value of the owner's separate property was
attributable to his or her direct or indirect actions during the relationship and
the non-owner's income and living standards are likely to be significantly
lower because of the division of functions within the relationship. The purpose
is to compensate the non-owner for the increase in value of the owner's
separate property.
Although s 15A is in some respects the companion of s 9A, it differs from
s 9A in significant respects. For a start, the increase in value is not converted
into relationship property. It remains the separate property of the owning
spouse or partner. Secondly, there are additional jurisdictional requirements.
Not only must there be an increase in value which is attributable to the owner's
direct or indirect actions, the non-owner's future income and living standards
must also be significantly lower than those of the owner as a result of the
division of functions. Those additional economic disparity requirements are
not easily satisfied. None of the applicants in the three cases where s 15A has
69 Property (Relation.ships) Act 1976. ss lM and IN.
70 This point was recognised by Bill Atkin and Wendy Parker Relationship Property in New
Zealand (Butterworths, Wellington. 2001) at 65.
71 Matrimonial Property Amendment Bill (109-2) (commentary from the Government
Administration Committee) at ix.
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been invoked was able to meet tbese requirements.^^ Even if tbey bad
establisbed jurisdiction, tbey would not bave been entitled as of rigbt to a sbare
of tbe increase in value, as tbey would if tbeir claim came under s 9A.
Compensation under s 15A is at tbe discretion of tbe Court and may be ordered
from any part of tbe owner's separate property or relationsbip property.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Section 9A is conceptually problematic, because it is inconsistent witb tbe
aims and principles of tbe Act in several respects. First, it undermines tbe
concept of separate property by converting tbe entire increase in value into
relationsbip property, even wben part of tbe increase is not attributable to tbe
application of relationsbip property or tbe actions of tbe non-owner.
Second, s 9A differentiates between monetary and non-monetary
contributions by attacbing different consequences to eacb. Tbis breacbes tbe
principle in s 1 N(b) tbat all forms of contribution to tbe partnersbip are treated
as equal. Section 18(2) gives explicit effect to tbat principle by stating tbat
tbere is no presumption tbat a contribution of a monetary nature is of greater
value tban a contribution of a non-monetary nature. Yet, s 9A makes exactly
tbat distinction. No justification for drawing tbis distinction is provided in any
of tbe parliamentary debates or committee reports. If tbe rationale of s 9A(2)
was to preserve tbe separate property concept, tben wby sbould tbat not apply
equally to s9A(l)? Tbe distinction could in some cases produce bizarre
results. Tbe application of a small, but not trivial, amount of relationsbip
property would entitle tbe non-owning spouse or partner to sbare equally in tbe
consequential increase in value, wbereas substantial actions by tbe non owner
are unlikely to result in equal sbaring of tbe increase in value. It is difficult to
see bow tbis sort of outcome satisfies tbe Act's purpose of a just division of tbe
fruits of tbe partnersbip.
Tbird, by dividing tbe increase in value in s 9A(2) on tbe basis of
contributions to property, tbe provision abandons tbe Act's fundamental
premise of focusing on contributions to tbe partnersbip. Tbe wbole point of tbe
1976 Act was to move away from tbe 1963 Act's property focus because it did
not acbieve a just division of tbe fruits of tbe marriage partnersbip. Section
9A(2) reverts to tbis rejected and outdated notion. Tbe section provides no
guidance as to bow sucb contributions are to be assessed. It is also tbe only
provision in tbe Act wbere division is property based. None of tbe exceptions
to equal sbaring rely on property contributions to determine division. Botb tbe
sbort duration and extraordinary circumstances exceptions divide relationsbip
property according to contributions to tbe relationsbip.^' Even sbort duration
de facto relationsbips, wbicb are not normally covered by tbe Act, come witbin
72 The husband in de Malmanche v de Malmanche [20021 2 NZLR 838 (HC) could not establish
the required causal nexus. Mrs Nation failed to establish both the nexus and the disparity
requirements: Nation v Nation (2002) 22 FRNZ 636 (FC) affirmed on appeal: [20051 3 NZLR
46 (CA). The de facto partner in LAN v RJL FC Gore FAM-2004-017-21, 18 August 2006,
failed for the same reasons.
73 Property (Relationships) Act 1976, ss 13 and I4-I4AA.
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the jurisdiction based on substantial contributions to the partnership.̂ "* Section
9A is therefore wholly at odds with the aims and principles of the Act.
Some of these inconsistencies may be explained by reference to the
legislative history of s 9A. The parliamentary debates and select committee
reports suggest that s 9A may not have been viewed holistically.^^ The concern
with s 9(3) Matrimonial Property Act was that only direct actions of the non-
owning spouse converted an increase in value of separate property into
relationship property. No concern was expressed in relation to the application
of matrimonial property as a causative element. Not surprisingly, perhaps,
attention in the reform process centred on the need to broaden the qualifying
actions, but restrict the consequences of reclassiftcation to avoid undermining
the separate property concept. That was in keeping with the general thrust of
the 2001 reforms. However, as a result of this legislative myopia, the
inconsistencies between the two limbs of s 9A appear to have been missed.
Concern to preserve the separate property concept may explain a
contributions-based division, but it does not explain a property-based division.
Despite being so fundamentally at odds with the Act's purpose and principles,
it is hard to see how it can be explained as a drafting error as is the case with
some other errors in the Act.̂ *
Whatever the explanation, reform of s 9A is needed if the conceptual
conundrum is to be resolved and increases in the value of separate property are
to be divided in accordance with the Act's purpose and principles. Two reform
options are presented for consideration.
The first option would amend s 9A(1) and (2) as follows:
9A When separate property becomes relationship property
(1) If any increase in the value of separate property, or any income or gains
derived from separate property, were attributable wholly or in part, directly or
indirectly, to the application of relationship property or the contributions of
the non-owning spouse or partner, then the increase in value or (as the case
requires) the income or gains are relationship property.
(2) In every case to which subsection (1) applies, sections 11(1), 11 A, 1 IB and
12 do not apply and the share of each spouse or partner in the increase in
value that has become relationship property is to be determined in accordance
with the contribution of each spouse or partner to the relationship.
Subsection (1) would classify the increase in value and remove the current
distinction in regard to causation. Both causative elements would be treated
alike, thus reflecting the principle that all forms of contributions should be
treated alike." While this has the potential to capture external causative
factors, such as inflation, any threat to the concept of separate property can be
addressed through unequal division provided for in subsection (2).
Subsection (2) deals with division of the increase in value and, again, does
not distinguish between the causative elements. But it excludes the
74 Property (Relationships) Act 1976, ss I4A and 85.
75 For example, the amendments to s 8.
76 For example, the omission of a time limit in s 89(l)(b) and the recently inserted s 2BAA,
accidentally omitted when civil unions were inserted into the Act.
77 Section lM.
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presumption of equal sharing and divides the increase in value in accordance
with the parties' contributions to the relationship. This idea is not new. It is
already the basis upon which relationship property is divided where there are
extraordinary circumstances that make equal sharing repugnant to justice
(s 13), and also where the relationship is one of short duration (ss 14 to 14AA).
It does not preclude equal division, but it recognises that other factors may
militate against it, such as the duration of the relationship and the inclusion of
inflation and other external factors. If re-drafted in this way, s 9A would create
a "third exception" to equal sharing.
An alternative, and arguably more principled, option would be to adopt a
narrow causative approach to classification, but to apply the ordinary
presumption of equal sharing to relationship property. There would be no need
for a clause dealing with division, merely one dealing with classification.
Section 9A(1) would then read as follows:
9A When separate property becomes relationship property
(1) If any increase in the value of separate property, or any income or gains
derived from separate property, were attributable directly or indirectly to the
application of relationship property or the contributions of the non-owning
spouse or partner, then that part of the increase in value or (as the case
requires) the income or gains are relationship property.
As with option one, this provision removes the current distinction in regard to
causation. However, the clause omits the words "wholly or in part" in the
current s 9A. In consequence, only the increase in value attributable to the
application of relationship property or contributions by the non-owning spouse
or partner is classified as relationship property. By not including external
factors, such as infiation, in the reclassification, full recognition is accorded to
the separate property concept. On the other hand, the exclusion of such
external factors may in some circumstances not do full justice to the non-
owner, particularly in long relationships. For example, in Rose v Rose, Mr
Rose would not have been able to retain the land without the contributions of
his wife and thus benefit from the increase in value due to infiation.
While we accept that these options may not resolve all of the problems
inherent in s 9A as it is currently worded, they better reflect the purpose and
principles of the Property (Relationships) Act and redress the conceptual
conundrum that s 9A is today.
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